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The issue of irregular migration from the South 
Mediterranean has grown in importance since the Arab 
Spring. In addition, calls from a number of Member 
States to reconsider the Schengen agreement have 
triggered a serious institutional debate over one of the 
basic European rights: free movement. These debates 
partly coincided with the institutional and policy 
changes brought by the enforcement of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which has modified the EU’s external action. 
The management of migratory flows is a complex 
institutional undertaking within the EU, which is 
addressed by expanding the importance of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and its 
international outreach through the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). However, will the institutions 
involved be able to coherently administer growing 
pressures in their policy responses? 
Managing migration from the 
South: JHA with External Action 
or External Action with JHA?  
Over the last years, the EU has put more and more 
emphasis on migratory flows coming from third 
countries as a policy of strategic importance in its 
foreign policy efforts, which comprise its economic, 
political and social relations with third countries. A 
common migration policy was not a priority on the 
Member States’ agenda, but the issue has risen to 
the fore through incremental institutionalization. 
A common immigration policy in the EU evolved 
from a lack of collaboration in the 1970s to an 
intergovernmental cooperation in the 1980s, making 
immigration control a Community competence, while 
also giving it an external dimension in the late 1990s1. 
Today, the primary aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to enable 
the EU to act in a more coherent and coordinated 
manner concerning issues pertaining to all policy areas. 
To this end and in relation to the justice and home 
affairs sphere, in 2009 the European Council urged the 
new High Representative (HR), the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission to “ensure 
better coherence between traditional external policy 
instruments and internal instruments with significant 
external dimensions, such as freedom, security and 
justice” (Council of the European Union 2009: 74).
The main trend which can be observed at the EU level 
is the so-called “externalization” of migration control—
the “external dimension” in European policy discourse. 
This issue deserves particular attention because it 
entails a considerable amount of criticism against the 
Community’s attempts to establish a comprehensive 
migration (and asylum) policy. Externalization is 
defined as the reproduction of the EU’s migration 
acquis in third countries—burden sharing in policing 
European borders, prevention of illegal migration, 
readmission agreements and creating migration 
management policies and facilities in the origin 
countries (capacity building). This results in a shift of 
focus from development and collaboration on the 
issue of legal migration and the human rights aspect 
1 The EU’s ability to act internationally within the JHA field 
became possible with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).
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to securing external borders (Doukoure, Oger 2007: 
2). A consequence of this “remote control” policy had 
been the implicit tolerance and collaboration with 
the undemocratic regimes in North Africa and the 
Middle East in order to promote the short-term goal of 
counteracting security threats towards the EU. 
The 2005 “Global Approach to Migration” action plan 
showed a changing frame of mind, which focused on 
the long-term solution of addressing the root cause 
of migration, human poverty, by fostering social and 
economic development in third countries. However, 
assistance to the countries of origin was later tackled 
through the 2007 European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which shifted the 
focus from engaging in these issues through the 
CFSP framework (Association Agreements for the 
Mediterranean countries) towards an externalization of 
migration2. Consequently, within the migration policy 
aspect, the ENP action plans put more emphasis on 
border control, counteracting illegal migration and 
terrorist threats, and building a solid national asylum 
system. 
Problems have arisen because the EU has been using 
both approaches, with more insistence on remote 
control, however, without clearly settling on one in 
particular.  Ripple effects of this lack of policy unity at 
the EU level are now affecting the EU. In addition, unlike 
in the case of the Eastern Partnership, the EU lacks 
solid “carrots” for the Mediterranean countries in return 
for sustainable reforms. Thus, home affairs elements 
are used to compensate for the lack of a solid foreign 
policy (Parkes 2011: 2) and foreign policy elements 
are inserted into the home affairs policy towards third 
states. The result today is a policy, which maintains 
the externalization of migration control but which 
gives more attention to root causes, thereby offering 
assistance including in democratic and institutional 
reforms, financial aid, employment, investments, visa 
facilitation and liberalisation, and mobility partnerships. 
This multifaceted approach will end up placing even 
more pressure and causing more confusion for third 
2 In line with this argument, in the Council Presidency 
Conclusions, more specifically in the section dealing with the external 
dimension of asylum and migration and partnership with third 
countries, it is stated that: “the EU should aim at assisting third countries, 
in full partnership, using existing Community funds where appropriate, 
in their efforts to improve their capacity for migration management and 
refugee protection, prevent and combat illegal immigration, inform on 
legal channels for migration, resolve refugee situations by providing 
better access to durable solutions, build border-control capacity, 
enhance document security and tackle the problem of return”.  
states given the multitude of actors in the foreign policy 
and home affairs spheres. 
The Lisbon changes – 
a curse in disguise?
\In the early days of 2010, when the new Barrosso Com-
mission was taking shape, there were concerns that the 
large number of portfolio overlaps would constitute a 
risk for the EU’s activity in several policy areas. In this 
sense, if we look strictly at external action, we can see 
a policy and responsibilities overlap between the CFSP 
(which remained intergovernmental) and the follow-
ing DGs: Development, International cooperation, hu-
manitarian aid, crisis response, Enlargement and neigh-
bourhood Policy. In contrast to Ashton’s initial proposal, 
Barrosso downgraded the HR’s authority by giving her 
indirect leverage over the Neighbourhood Policy port-
folio, which has a very large share of the budget, but 
leaving it under the Commission’s responsibility. Never-
theless, he specifically pointed out the certain Commis-
sioners would act as Ashton’s deputies even if there is 
no such stipulation in the Lisbon Treaty3. Given the com-
plexity of the tasks, an accommodation procedure was 
surely needed to create an effective modus operandi. 
However, no such blueprint was officially sketched out, 
thus leaving room for friction. 
The newly created European External Action 
Service (EEAS), tasked with everyday external policy 
implementation, rather increases the bureaucratic 
burden than streamlines the activities of all these 
entities. The 2010 struggle over the composition of 
the EEAS and its role in handling development aid was 
an illustration of such friction, this time between the 
Commission and the Member States, but also between 
various EU institutions. The deputy DGs have to work in 
“close cooperation” with the EEAS and the latter even 
has a percentage of their staff, but the Commissioners 
themselves retaine room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis their 
policy area. 
In case of a more specific policy, such as third country 
migration into the EU, the picture becomes even more 
complicated. In addition to the aforementioned entities, 
even more DGs are added, which also have duties 
3 The Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament 
also stated in its recommendation on the EEAS’ organization and 
working methods that in Ashton’s absence, briefings to the EP 
would be done either by the three Commissioners (in areas under 
Community authority) or the foreign affairs minister of the country 
holding the EU presidency for CFSP issues.
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relating to this type of issue4. The external dimension of 
migration control shed light on the so-called “cross-pillar 
issues”, which have blurred the internal-external security 
distinction, “[t]he implication [being] that that the location 
of responsibility for migration within national and EU 
political systems also becomes more complex” (Geddes 
2009: 23).The necessity to foster closer consultation and 
collaboration within the Commission between several 
policy areas and JHA poses administrative obstacles 
and runs the risk of resulting in policy incoherence and 
inefficient decision-making because of potential “turf wars” 
(Collett 2009: 15). A recent example is the release of the 
revised Neighbourhood Policy which was postponed also 
due to Ashton’s interventions over its unsatisfying content 
and her desire to become more involved in enlargement 
aspects (Jozwiak, 2011). Since both Commissioners aim at 
representing European interests overseas in relation to the 
same policy areas, it is to be expected that similar internal 
toe-stepping will continue. 
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty inflated hopes that 
migration policy will be more effectively formulated 
and implemented, but institutional and administrative 
challenges have arisen. There are concerns that the 
combination between the Stockholm Programme 
and Lisbon will only delay decision-making due to 
inter-institutional fault-lines, the increased role of the 
European Parliament and the national legislatures. A 
mandatory consent of the EP regarding migration policy 
can lead to incomplete examination of proposals and 
the emergence of new frontlines compared to the ones 
already existing within the Council5, between the EP 
and the Council,6and the Council and the Commission7. 
Consequently, the intergovernmental JHA Council is 
likely to set the agenda and design the migration policies 
instead of the Commission (Angenendt, Parkes 2009: 1). 
Tailor-made strategy
for the Mediterranean
In the Mediterranean, the main cause of concern has 
been the migratory flows of undocumented people 
landing on EU shores. In 2010 millions of migrants were 
4 DGs such as: Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
and Home Affairs (resulted from the recent split of the JHA DG), 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Education and Culture, 
Trade, Economic and Financial Affairs.
5 For instance, regarding burden sharing in receiving 
asylum seekers.
6 Regarding the EP’s new prerogative over criminal justice 
and police cooperation.
7 For example, concerning the existence of a single system 
for legal migration into the EU.
amassed in Libya, since its shores had not been subject 
to harsh controls, in order to cross over towards Italy 
and Malta (L’Helgoualc’h 2010). In March 2011, a large 
number of North African refugees (Tunisians, Egyptians 
and Libyans) landed on the Italian island of Lampedusa 
and later attempted to cross the French border, an event 
which prompted Italy and France to call for a reform of 
the Schengen rules. 
The HR and the Commission proposed a differentiated 
approach in the region and a long-term partnership for 
migration, mobility and security. The approach detailed 
the immediate and long-term responses to the crises 
in its immediate vicinity and underlined that these two 
institutions “are ready to play a bigger role in the Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM) in line with the Lisbon 
Treaty” (European Commission – High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
2011). However, it was made clear that the EU’s 
cooperation with third states remains performance-
based, i.e. only those that register significant progress 
in their democratic and rule of law reforms and in 
their (externalized) migration control efforts (“more for 
more”). After recent revolutionary events, the EU has 
somewhat more leverage in the region: it dangles the 
development aid and visa liberalisation carrot in return 
for democratic, economic and social reforms, but it 
does not give up on the security aspects of irregular 
migration8.  
The EU’s relations with the states in the Mediterranean 
were mainly administered by the ENP and the UfM, 
which supports regional dialogue and cooperation 
between the EU-27, the Commission and countries 
bordering the Mediterranean (except Libya who has 
observer status), including those located in the Western 
Balkans. The UfM’s strictly intergovernmental structure 
and perceived French, and not European, outlook 
diminished its role in the region. However, after the 
Arab Spring, the EU is looking towards it as a medium 
through which to address some of the root causes of 
migration: poverty, unemployment and the lack of 
prospects.
In this context, it is the daunting duties of the HR to 
manage the migration dossier by: 1) helping the 
Member States arrive at a common denominator 
within responsible institutions; 2) mediating the 
relationship between the institutions and third 
8 To this end, the reviewed ENP paper states that it “aims 
to develop a mutually beneficial approach where economic 
development in partner countries and in the EU, well-managed 
legal migration, capacity-building on border management, asylum 
and effective law-enforcement co-operation go hand in hand”.
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countries; 3) coordinating the work of several other 
DGs while trying to avoid turf wars and 4) overseeing 
the crisis management efforts of the Instrument for 
Stability, the deliverance of humanitarian aid and the 
changes envisaged by the neighbourhood policy and 
in response to the Arab Spring. 
Conclusion 
and recommendations
Numerous initiatives and institutions within the EU 
tasked to deal with the migratory issue concerning its 
external dimension present a number of deficiencies. 
Issues of trust, burden-sharing and the need to take re-
sponsibility within the EU hinder the coagulation of a 
coherent and consistent common migration policy. 
In order to adequately deal with the migration flows, 
the competent EU institutions need to insist on 
building an integrated approach and a homogeneous 
policy of legal immigration and labour mobility based 
on entry and exit requirements, quotas, and required 
documents. In addition, market integration needs to be 
stepped up in order to support economic development 
in the region. 
Tremendously important is that the EU reforms entirely 
the Dublin Regulation, which established the “first-
come-first-responsibility” principle.9Despite its initial 
intentions, this system placed overwhelming pressure 
on receiving states, leading to intentions to reform 
the Schengen Agreement. Southern European states 
have been repeatedly asking for a reform to respect 
the solidarity principle and burden sharing promises 
made by Northern states. The response has been 
disappointing despite legal attempts to encourage 
9 The principle refers to the fact that asylum requests are to 
be dealt with by the first EU country in which a migrant enters.
action within the voluntary system. Given the present 
circumstances and the fact that migratory pressures 
will continue, other Member States should accept more 
asylum applicants.
The entities dealing with external policy need to 
improve informal delineation of competencies in order 
to deliver uniform messages and display a united front 
to third parties. EU external action towards the South 
needs to be more consistent: Ashton and Füle either 
have to display a very united approach or they have to 
choose who is best suited to play the first fiddle. The 
alternative would be a struggle between competencies 
and resources which will only hamper the Union’s 
objectives. 
The intention to revitalise the UfM to manage the 
situation could be a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, UfM may allow for a more balanced interaction 
between the EU and non-EU members. On the other 
hand, it may sidetrack the EU’s foreign policy objectives 
if Member States insist on advancing their own interests. 
The HR or the Neighbourhood Commissioner has to take 
on a more visible role in the UfM to encourage regional 
dialogue and integration and not let it get captured by 
individual states. This also entails the above-mentioned 
competency delineation between Ashton and Füle.   
Finally, efforts to stabilize Libya should be enhanced to 
foster a secure environment not only for the Libyans and 
migrants waiting on its shores, but also for the whole 
region. In addition, the EU should seek to integrate it into 
the UfM, renegotiate the halted Framework Agreement 
and commit to supporting its short and long-term 
development under the ENP. The Member States which 
have military presence in Libya must allow the HR the 
necessary room for diplomatic manoeuvre to grasp the 
opportunity for a truly European response to the crisis 
of closest proximity since the Balkan conflicts.
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